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NANCY LEE PELUSO*

"Traditions"of Forest Control
in Java: Implications for Social
Forestry and Sustainability
ABSTRACT
Ideally, socialforestry programs and philosophies are intended
to involve local people in the management and distribution offorest
resources. In practice, the structures of socialforestry programs are
influenced by political, economic, and culturalfactorsat nationaland
local levels. When socialforestry programs entail the reallocationof
access to forest resources on state lands, power relationsare particularly influential.As the case of the Java Social ForestryProgramillustrates, powerful social forces that have historically shaped the
nationalforest management agency and the social structures offorest-based villages have distortedsocialforestry ideals. When their traditional management tools are unable to curb deforestation and the
social processes causing deforestation,forestry agencies may be persuaded to implement socialforestry policies. The natures of changes
in forestry programsand the orientationof socialforestry are inevitably subject to local negotiationand renegotiation. The outcomes of
negotiation, however, are dependent on the structures of power relations both before and after implementation of new policies.

* Professor Peluso teaches at the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies. The
research on which this paper is based was carried out in Java, Indonesia and in the Echols
Collection at Cornell University from October 1984 through October 1986. Additional data
were collected on a short trip to the Netherlands in November 1987 and during an evaluation
of the social forestry program I conducted in January 1987. The study was supported by
grants from the Ford Foundation and the Cornell Southeast Asia Program. Field research in
Indonesia was sponsored by the Center for Environmental Research, Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia and the State Forestry Corporation of Java. I am particularly
indebted to the latter, without whose cooperation research would have been impossible. Different versions of this paper were presented at the American Sociological Association's 1988
annual meeting and the Association of Asian Studies 1989 annual meeting. Iam indebted to
Stephen Bunker, Jeffrey Paige, Jesse Ribot, Mark Ritchie, and William Sunderlin for their
comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Where I have not heeded their advice, of course, I
am responsible for its shortcomings.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the mid-1970s, social forestry has been a movement in international forestry development.1 In the past decade, social forestry has
been implemented on both private and state lands in many countries,
with mixed results.2 One of the objectives of social forestry is to empower
local people by involving them in management decisions. 3 Despite the
increasing international concern with social forestry, however, state structures of traditional forest management have not facilitated the reallocation
of power to forest communities through social forestry.
In general, national governments expect state foresters to produce
marketable timber and other forest products. Professional foresters manage forests for timber and other products on a large scale for export or
domestic luxury wood markets. Foresters in state-owned production forests have traditionally been reluctant to increase local people's access to or
control over forest land and other resources unless the people are
employed as forest laborers; they do not allow them to act as managers
and use the forest for local needs. 4 Foresters and other government officials have often assumed that reducing people's legal access to the forests
would reduce their claims on forest resources. The contrary, however, has
more frequently proven true: foresters who have fanatically applied 'scientific' production forestry methods to the exclusion of local people have
been confronted by both organized and spontaneous forms of protest by
forest-dependent people.5 The challenge of social forestry to state foresters, then, is to replace traditional concepts of 'scientific' professional management and state control with the more radical assumption that giving
peasants more control is more likely to lead to sustainable forest management.
1. See, e.g., L. Fortmann, Great Planting Disasters: Pitfalls in Technical Assistance in Forestry, 1988 (Wint./Spring) Agric. & Hum. Values 49-50 (1988). See generally J.Westoby, The
Purpose of Forests: Follies of Development (1987) (discussing the general evolution of forestry and social forestry policy since World War II).
2. See, e.g., V.Shiva, Social Forestry-No Solution within the Market, 2 Ecologist 158,165,167
(1982); N. Peluso & M. Poffenberger, Social Forestry in Java: Reorienting the Bureaucracy, 48
Hum. Organization 333-42 (1989); Fortmann, supranote 1,at 50,52-58; Community and Forestry: Continuities in the Sociology of Natural Resources (R. Lee et al. eds, 1990).
•3. For definitions of social forestry see, e.g., J. Romm, Forest Policy and Development Policy,
2 J. World Forest Resource Mgmt (1989): K. Freerk Wiersum, Development Strategies for
Social Forestry: A Conceptual Approach 1 (East-West Center Working Paper Series, 1984). See
also Fortmann, supra note 1, at 50; and J.Kirschhoffer & E. Mercer, Putting Social and Community Forestry in Perspective in the Asia Pacific Region (East-West Center Working Paper
Series, 1984) (outlining reasons for the emergence of social forestry in Asia).
4. N. Peluso, Rich Forests, Poor People: Resource Control and Resistance in Java 17, 18
(1992).
5. See, e.g., R. Guha, The Unquiet Woods: Ecological Change and Resistance in the Indian
Himalaya chs. 3,4,5, and 7 (1990); E. Hong, The Natives of Sarawak ch.7 (1987); Peluso, supra
note 4, at chs. 4, 6 and 7.
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This paper explores Indonesia's effort to implement a social forestry program in Java, and the structural obstacles impeding implementation. Java is an important case study for two reasons. First, Java has a long
history of state forest management based on exclusionary policies.
Because of the high value of teak for export, the Dutch colonial government began the practice of excluding local people from access to forest
land, to certain valuable species of trees, and to opportunities for converting forests to farm use. 6 Today the Indonesian government owns most of
Java's forests and manages them through the Java State Forestry Corporation (SFC).7 The SFC manages large areas of forest as plantations of teak,
pine, or other species. Many of these plantations were first created by the
Dutch. 8 The environmentalist community has of late applauded teak
plantation management in Java, largely because of its 'well-managed rotations' and because the SFC has initiated a social forestry program.9 Nonetheless, the SFC's control has been waning in some areas. Although
various individuals and groups have evaluated the Java Social Forestry
Program, 10 no one has analyzed it in terms of the SFC's use of the program
to renegotiate its control over land, trees, and people. Moreover, when the
Java Social Forestry Profram began as a pilot program in 1986, it received
some positive reviews.' An updated analysis of the program is salient in
light of cumulative changes in the program.
6. Peluso, supra note 4, at chs. 2, 3 (detailing the history of colonial and precolonial state
controls on forests in Java).
7. The exceptions are the tribal forests owned under customary law by the Badui people
in West Java, and the few nature reserves managed by the Ministry of Forestry's division of
Nature Conservation and Forest Preservation.
8. See J.W.H Cordes, De Djati-bosschen op Java; hunne natuur, verspreiding, gesheidenis
en exploitatie 204-68 (1881) (providing a detailed discussion of the history of teak forest
exploitation and plantation establishment in Java). See also Peluso, supranote 4, at 50-60,6467 (summarizing the history of plantation establishment and its 'fit' within Dutch colonial
policy).
9. See Rainforest Alliance, The 'Smart Wood' Certification Program (1991) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Rainforest Alliance, New York). See also W. Reid et al., Bankrolling Successes: A Portfolio of Sustainable Development Projects (1988).
10. See, e.g., C. Barber, State, People and The Environment: The Genesis and Transformation of Social Forestry Policy in New Order Indonesia (1989) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of California (Berkeley)); Peluso & Poffenberger, supra note 2; W. Sunderlin, The
Resistance of the Poor and the State's Call to Equity: A Perspective Through Social Forestry
in Java (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on fie with the author); F. Seymour, Social Forestry
on Public Lands in Indonesia: A Blurring of Ends and Means? (1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University).
11. See, e.g., Reid et al., supra note 9; and Peluso & Poffenberger, supra note 2 (This paper
relies on the same data reported by Peluso and Poffenberger for some of its field material.
While the latter was generally a favorable reporting on the social forestry program in Java,
this article is more critical. This is due partly to the current paper's placement of these issues
in a broader political economic perspective vis-a-vis Indonesia's current forest policy and
partly because of a change in my interpretation of the program over the past several years.
The views expressed in this paper are my own.)
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Analysis shows that SFC foresters are caught among the SFC's
three, often contradictory, ideologies or mandates. The SFC, mandated to
generate revenues, preserves future forest resources, and provides
employment, broadly defined here as income-generating opportunities,
particularly to forest villages, defined as all those villages enclosed by or
adjacent to the state forest lands. Because the Indonesian government has
emphasized revenue production, SFC foresters, in applying scientific forestry management practices, also have used coercive tactics to protect production forests from local people. On reforestation lands designated for
social forestry under the Java Social Forestry Program, ideologies of rural
development and Tpeople's participation, which are part of the social forestry philosophy,' have led the SFC to adopt a gentler form of forest stewardship. However, as shown below, historical forces embedded in the
SFC's structure, and the foresters' custodial and police training, have
undermined the participatory aspects of the Java Social Forestry Program.
The remainder of this paper is divided into two major sections,
reflecting the two different approaches to forest management operative
today in Java. The first section explores whether traditional plantation
production of Javanese teak is sustainable, given the nature of the political-economic pressures on its production. To address this question, I discuss the forms of state resource control and then describe the political
economy of teak in Java. I argue that social and political circumstances
render the current management practices increasingly unsustainable,
even on forestlands where social forestry has not yet been applied.
The second section compares traditional forms of state control
over forest resources to the structure of the current social forestry program. This section illustrates, first, how social processes work to confound
'ideal types' of structural change, such as those implied by the social forestry philosophy, particularly when change originates outside national or
regional boundaries. Second, this section illustrates how powerful institu-'
tional factors may try to redefine those changes to fit the traditional mold
of state control over forest resources.

SUSTAINABILITY OF TEAK
PRODUCTION FROM PLANTATIONS
Social Origins of Teak Production from Plantations
Overextraction of teak began with the restriction of access to the
trees under two regimes of primarily Dutch colonial control. 13 In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the United East India Company
(Verigdene Oost Indie Compagnie or VOC), acting under the authority of the
12. See Fortmann, supra note 1, at 51.
13. See Peluso, supra note 4, at 36-78.
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Dutch government, annexed the districts where teak grew best, claiming
control of the timber as well as of the local laborers employed to harvest
and deliver the timber. By the mid-nineteenth century, the Dutch colonial
government controlled all of Java. By the end of that century, the nature of
state control had shifted emphasis from controlling rights to cut timber
and employ forest laborers to controlling forestland itself. 14 Colonial land
use maps defined certain territories as state forest, laying the basis for
'legitimate' state control of forestlands in the future.
Through the late nineteenth and early twentieth -centuries, a
bureaucracy of professional, 'scientifically' trained foresters (with a strong
15
dose of police training) laid the foundations of state forest management.
After independence in 1945, Indonesian foresters assumed the role held
by Dutch foresters. Forest laws were translated from Dutch into Indonesian without substantive change. 16 The new Indonesian Forest Service
took control of the same forest lands that the colonial forest service had
claimed. 17 The Indonesian Forest Service was the institutional predecessor to the SFC. Separate branches of a state teak enterprise, P.N. Perhutani,
were formed in Central and East Java in 1961 and were joined in 1972. In
or State
1978, West Java forests were added and a single Perum Perhutani,
18
Forestry Corporation, was formed to manage Java's forests.
Unlike the Dutch, the new Indonesian foresters faced the need to
rehabilitate thousands of hectares of forest destroyed during the Japanese
occupation, the subsequent revolution, and its aftermath. 9 Competing
pressures existed within the forest service and subsequent forestry agencies in the 1950s and 1960s. Foresters were also competing with forest villagers, and villagers with each other, to maintain or regain control over
access to the forest. These pressures have never been resolved, as evidenced by the unsustainable management system currently practiced on
most of Java's forest lands.
Figure 1 shows the cumulative effect of over-extraction on forest
structure. Forty-seven percent of the politically designated teak forestlands (or 70 percent of the teak forestlands capable of production) is in the
early stages of growth, known as 'non-economic' age-classes one through
14. See Peluso, supra note 4, at chs. 2,3 (discussing the transformation of the forms of colonial control on forests in Java).
15. Id. at ch. 3.
16. See Bosordonansi Jawa Madura 1927; Bosverordening Jawa Madura 1932; Undangundang No. 5 Tahun 1967, reprinted in Perum Perhutani, Publication No. 1.199.287 (1984) in
Peluso, supra note 4, at 97. Cf. Departemen Kehutanan, 2 Sejarah Kehutanan Indonesia 43
(1986) (stating that only those Dutch forest laws which fit the goals of the Indonesian revolution were to be translated into Indonesian). See also Peluso, supra note 4, at 98-99 (discussing
the attempts to make the new Forest Service more 'people-oriented' than production oriented).
17. See Peluso, supranote 4, at 109.
18. Id. at 126.
19. Id. at 109.
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FIGURE 1. Teak Forest Age-classes and
Unproductive Forest Land Categories, 1982, Central Java

four. (Trees routinely thinned in managing these forests have some economic value to the SFC but the costs of protecting and harvesting the trees
offset their potential value.) The primary sources of income for the contemporary SFC are the Central and East Java forest plantations established

by Dutch foresters in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
and natural forests left uncut by the Dutch. 20 Tracts that can be clear-cut
within the decade are those in later growth stages, represented by age
classes eight through twelve. 21 These tracts comprise only 6.5 percent 22 of

designated teak forests. The tremendous skew between the area of forestland under young, less productive forest and the area of forestland of high
economic value (age-classes five and older) illustrates the unsustainable
nature of teak production at current levels of teak extraction (and revenue)

over the long-term (Figure 2). Moreover, the area of presently unproductive and non-teak producing teak forest23 in need of rehabilitation greatly
exceeds the area of mature forest to be clear cut within the next 40 years.

20. Interview with a provincial (Unit) official, in Java (Nov. 10, 1984).
21. Age-class, as used here, refers to the management system used for the aggregation of
trees by age. Teak, for example, typically had an 80-year rotation period, and is divided into
eight, ten-year age classes. Based on this system, every year one-eightieth of the teak forest is
slated for harvest, or in every decade one-eighth of the forest is supposed to be cut and reforested. Age-classes 9-12 are either old growth plantations or natural growth. These tracts
were not cut sooner because of remote location or other managerial considerations. In some
areas, 40-60 year rotations are now planned, but these remain in the minority.
22. Figure includes the 'MR' category, an underproductive rather than unproductive teak
production category.
23. As used in Figure 1, the unproductive forest land categories translate as: poor increment (MR), just cut (JC), empty land (EL), unproductive teak land (UTP), not good for
clearcutting (NCC), and not good for teak (NGT).
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FIGURE 2. Production Schedule of Central Java Teak Forest, 1982
Current patterns of forest extraction are unsustainable for three
reasons. First, state foresters overharvest teak to satisfy national political
and economic pressures; second, forest farmers keep much of the forest
under agriculture to maintain local control of the land; and third, forest
thieves operating in regional and local networks reduce stocks available to
state producers. These activities have evolved for historical reasons and
should not be construed as recent developments.

PRESSURES BY THE STATE ON FORESTERS TO OVERCUT
State Control of Forest Resources
Teak is an important part of the Indonesian political economy. The
luxury commodity is sold on domestic and world markets and its production is monopolized by a powerful parastatal. State bureaucracies or parastatal corporations that directly manage natural resources face different
policymaking constraints than do resource management bureaucracies
that lease exploitation rights to private firms. The state forest agency, like
other state enterprises, must earn enough revenues to pay for its operations and provide a surplus for the government's other activities.24The
surplus is invested in the state formally or informally through bribes and
payoffs to the bureaucrats. 25 Thus, the agency must conserve the forest
resource base implicitly for its own survival, as well as explicitly for the
benefit of future generations. Similarly, it is in the professional forester's
24. R. Robison, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital 116 (1986).
25. See id. at 238-42. See also P. Blaikie, The Political Economy of Soil Erosion in Developing
Countries 83-87 (1985); S. Bunker, Underdeveloping the Amazon: The Failure of the Modem
State 180-82 (1985).
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interest to retain control
over forest lands and the distribution of the prod26
ucts of those lands.
The state forest agency's tasks of producing timber and conserving the forest base are complicated by its associated mandate to develop or
improve the welfare of surrounding communities. In such cases, the government expects the forestry agency simultaneously to generate a surplus,
to prevent environmental degradation, and to prevent or alleviate local
poverty. Depending on the immediacy of each mandate at any given time,
the state forestry agency will give27one or more of the contradictory functions precedence over the others.
State foresters in Indonesia, as elsewhere, have traditionally controlled forest laborers and forest villagers by controlling these people's
access to forest lands and products, and by adopting state and international forestry ideologies to buttress or legitimize these controls. Traditional forest controls, however, have failed to prevent forest conversion,
tree theft, and land degradation. By the 1970s and early 1980s, state forest-

ers were willing to restructure forestry programs to some degree. Nevertheless, the nature of early community forestry programs, 28 and the de
facto negotiations between state foresters and forest-dependent people to
redefine forest access in current social forestry programs, indicates that
SFC foresters have been reluctant to relinquish their traditional controls
over forest management.
The SFC's interpretation of forestry often resembles the Germanic-Prussian tradition of state forest management29 of the early eighteenth century more than contemporary concepts of social forestry. For
example, as in the Germanic-Prussian tradition, the colonial and then the
independent government in Indonesia controlled access to state forestland, state-monopolized species, and forest employment. 3 0 In parallel
types of industrial structuring, first the Dutch colonial forest service regu26. See Blaikie, supra note 25, at 84-85.
27. See Peluso, supra note 4, at 10; Bunker, supra note 25, at 105-8.
28. SeeS. Atmosoedarjo, Memori Serah Terima Direksi Perum Perhutani 50-73 (1981) (outlining various versions of the early "Prosperity Approach" programs).
29. The origins of forest management for the king, and later the state, lie in Germany and
France. This type of forest management has been characterized by a militaristic style of control of strategic, land-based resources, and a regimented approach to the management of field
foresters. See K. Mantel, Historyof the InternationalScience of Forestrywith Special Consideration
of Central Europe: Literature,Training,and Researchfrom the Earliest Beginnings to the Nineteenth
Century,in I Int'l Rev. Forestry Res. 1,4 (J.Romberger & P. Mikola eds., 1964). See also L. Fortmann &S. Fairfax, American ForestryProfessionalismin the Third World: Some PreliminaryObservationson Effects, in Women Creating Wealth: Transforming Economic Development 105-8 (R.
Gallin & A. Spring eds., 1985) (arguing that American schools of forestry, fashioned in the
Germanic tradition, educate contemporary foresters all over the world, just as the European
schools educated and influenced colonial foresters worldwide). See generally Westoby, supra
note 1, at 3-70 (discussing the politics, legitimacy, and appropriateness of industrial forestry
for development in developing countries).
30. See Peluso, supranote 4, at 124, 130-40.
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larized teak production in forest plantations31 and then the SFC integrated
logging with industrial wood products conversion. 32 Both transformations virtually ignored the potentially negative socio-political impacts of
these 'technological' changes. As a result, plantation 'teak production'
today is a politically and socially unsustainable mode of forest management.
33
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TEAK IN JAVA

Political and Economic Pressures to Overharvest Teak
Forestry, Indonesia's second largest income-producing industry
after oil, consistently contributed 12 to 14 percent of non-oil foreign
exchange earnings in Indonesia through the early 1980s.34 However, only
6.5 percent of Indonesia's timber comes from Java, and Java teak provides
only some 2.5 percent of forestry's foreign exchange earnings.35 Nonetheless, Java is one of the world's three largest teak producers. 36 Teak forest
officially occupies only one-third of Java's three million hectares of state
forestland3 7 and one-half of Java's production forest, yet teak accounts for
85 percent of the SFC's total income. 38 The SFC supports itself and pays
development taxes with revenues from teak.39 To ensure profits, the SFC
has a monopoly on the domestic harvesting, transport, and marketing of
raw teak and controls most forest village development programs and all
forest labor.4° In essence, the SFC
is a 'state within a state' like Pertamina,
41
the Indonesian oil corporation.
31. Id. atch. 3.
32. Id. at 140.
33. This section draws heavily from Peluso, supra note 4, at 141-49.
34. Government of Indonesia-International Institute of Environment and Development,
III Report on Phase I of "A Review of Policies Affecting the Sustainable Development of Forest Lands in Indonesia" 111 (1985); J. Tarrant et al., Natural Resources and Environmental
Management in Indonesia 1-20 (1987).
35. Government of Indonesia-International Institute of Environment and Development,
supra note 34, at 95; Tarrant, supra note 34, at 1-20.
36. Burma and Thailand are the others in the top three.
37. Forestland is a political, not a biological, category. Some 25 percent (10 percent publicly) of Java's forest lands are recognized as 'empty land'; for Central Java, some 31 percent
of the teak forest is either unproductive entirely or does not produce teak. See H. Prastowo,
Peningkatan Manfaat Hutan dan Pembangunan Masyarakat Lingkungan 6 (1983) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Perum Perhutani Unit I, Semarang).
38. Persatuan Sarjana Kehutanan Indonesia Cabang Jawa Tengah, Suatu Tinjauan Tentang
Daurfati di Jawa, in Proceedings Seminar Daur Jati 39 (Persatuan Sarjana Kehutanan Indonesia eds., 1985).
39. See Perum Perhutani, Perum Perhutani 1981-85, at 14-16 (1985) (presenting illustrations of the percentage and absolute amounts of taxes paid to the state by the State Forestry
Corporation).
40. See Peluso, supra note 4, at 135.
41. See Robison, supra note 24, at 244.
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State Forest Lands
Primary Teak Zone

FIGURE 3.

Forested Area of Java

Secondary teak zone includes some area under teak (shaded areas), but of lower commercial value to
the State Forestry Corporation. White areas surrounding both primary and secondary teak zones were
teak forest before arrival of the United States East India Company.

In many parts of the teak forest, teak trees are more valuable than
the land they grow on, because the soils supporting the best teak forest are
ill-suited to intensive agriculture.42 Teak thrives on sites characterized by
well-drained soils containing some calcium (lime), little rain, and a dis-

tinct dry season lasting at least three months. 43 In the limestone hills of
Central and East Java, the thin soils and porous bedrock are notoriously
poor for agriculture and support few trees other than teak. Little water is
available through irrigation or natural sources. Agricultural land in this

zone is generally worth less than on the alluvial plains and volcanic hillsides of Java.
Teak is highly valued, both domestically and on export markets. It
is expensive, whether in the form of raw logs or sawn wood, and it is consistently subject to theft. On a volume basis, on the official domestic market teak logs sold for approximately US $68 per m 3 in 1985 and sawn teak
sold for approximately US $97.44 On the export market, teak lumber sold
for an average of US $574 per m 3 in 1984.45 Given an average wastage in
the sawmilling process of approximately sixty percent,46 the value of the
raw logs sawn for export was approximately US $225 per m 3 .On the black

market, average prices are somewhat lower because the wood is generally
42. But see Government of Indonesia-International Institute of Environment and Develop0 ment, supra note 34, at 36 ("It is estimated that at least 50 percent of the teak and other forests

are situated on land which is highly suitable for agriculture." Id. The report's subsequent discussion of this issue does not clarify what percent of the teak forest is on "land which is
highly suitable for agriculture." It could be argued that the best forestland for agriculture is.
that on the lower slopes of the island's many volcanos and where forest occupies alluvial
plains. An estimate of this area is not possible given available data.)
43 C. van Steenis et al., Flora: Untuk Sekolah di Indonesia 360, 361 (Moeso Suijowinoto
et al. trans., 3d ed. 1981).
44. Perum Perhutani, Buku Saku Statistik Tahun 1982-1986 at 42 (1987).
45. Perum Perhutani, I Proceeding Rapat Paripurna Perum Perhutani Tahun 1984: Materi
Rapat 17 (1985).
46. Id. at 30.
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illegally obtained and thus smaller in diameter to facilitate easy transport.47 Black market teak is generally converted into lumber manually,
wastage, and painted or stored underground for sevfurther increasing
48
eral months.

Foresters claim that teak theft from state plantations is a problem
common to virtually every forest district. Few, if any, undisturbed hectares
of teak forest remain.49 On a per hectare basis, mature trees in undisturbed
forest on high quality sites, if sold as logs on the domestic market, might
be valued at US $9,000 per hectare. 50 An upper-echelon SFC official estimated that the average value per hectare in Central Java's teak forest is
one-quarter of its potential value; in East Java, he estimated that the average value per hectare is one-fifth its potential (potential being determined
by scientifically planned thinning and harvesting). 51 Foresters acknowledge that the thinnings are now done (unscientifically) by local people.
Where many trees have been stolen, foresters thin fewer trees.52 In addition, mature teak is becoming increasingly rare because older plantation
trees are being removed without being replaced, losses due to war damages have not been recovered for reasons which are discussed below, and
reforestation efforts have failed.53
From 1980 to 1983, Indonesia began to phase in a ban on log
exports in order to stimulate domestic industry. Today, all wood exports
must be processed into sawn timber, plywood, veneer, or other conversions.4 The purposes of the ban on raw log exports were to correct rapid
deforestation problems, increase employment, and add value to forest
products prior to export. These problems had primarily afflicted forestry
in the Outer Islands (i.e., islands outside the55Java-Bali-Madura group,
such as Kalimantan, Sumatra, and Irian Jaya).
47. Interviews with forest police and forest district managers, in Java (Sept. 1985; jan.-Feb.
1986) (notes on file with the author).
48. Interviews with forest villagers and forest police, in Java (May-Sept. 1985 and Jan.Feb. 1986) (notes on file with the author).
49. Interviews with H. Simon, in East Java (Jan. 1986) and with M. Bratamiharja, in Jakarta
(May 1985) (notes on file with the author).
50. Calculated from H. Simon, Analisa "Interrelationship" Antara Pembangunan Kehutanan Dengan Pembangunan Masyarakat Desa 83 (1983) (unpublished Masters Thesis, Gadjah Mada University (Yogyakarta, Indonesia)). Divided over 80 years, of course, the value per
hectare is far less.
51. Interview with M. Bratamihardja, in Java (May 15,1985) (notes on file with the author).
52. Interviews with forest district managers, in Java (Apr.-May 1985) (notes on fie with
the author).
53. See N. Peluso, Report on Social Forestry Field Research in West and Central Java 2022 (1986). See generally Tim Peneliti Social Forestry Indonesia, Summary Report Studi Kasus
Social Forestry Di Jawa Tengah, Jawa Barat dan Tana Toraja 9 (1985); Peluso, supra note 4, at
chs. 5,7.

54. Tarrant et al., supra note 34, at 7.
55. See generallyR. Repetto, The Forest for the Trees?: Government Policies and the Misuse
of Forest Resources 43-51 (1988).
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The ban on raw log exports has affected the SFC's production and
marketing strategies for teak. Only the best quality timber can be used
for export products; however, the quantity of high quality teak is limited.STThe SFC began to cut back on exporting raw logs as early as 1974.58
Most Java teak has been sold domestically because of the high domestic
demand and the high cost of producing wood products of export quality.59 However, although less than eight percent of the volume cut was proin 1984, these exports contributed some 24
cessed and exported by the SFC
60
percent of the SFC's income.
Although in the medium or long-term the SFC can increase its
profits by exporting finished teak products, teak processing operations
benefit few of the millions of people living in villages adjacent to the teak
forest. Forest policy precludes private conversion of teak into furniture or
boards within nine miles of the forest borders and never in villages
enclosed by the forest boundaries. This policy is aimed at discouraging
unauthorized forest cutting and has been in effect since the establishment
of the SFC in its most recent institutional form (1972). As a result, in forestedge villages, private (non-licensed) sawmills or wood production only
exist as clandestine operations that do not benefit forest villagers. Further,
much teak furniture for the domestic luxury market is produced by private entrepreneurs in cities, such as Surakarta, Semarang, Jepara, and
Surabaya, which border the teak zone but are far from the source regions
and thus rarely provide employment for forest villagers.
Those employed by the SFC to log teak earn relatively good
wages; however, opportunities are limited and seasonal. 61 Logging activities are rotated around a district from block to block, thus logging jobs are
rarely available to people in a single village in consecutive years. Logging
in a teak production block (16 to 24 hectares) generally proceeds for one or
two years, employing temporary labor from nearby and distant villages
primarily during the dry season. The SFC does not retain any loggers on a
permanent basis. A rough calculation shows employment opportunities
in one district to be about 339 per year, compared to approximately

131,000 men aged 15 to 50 in the labor force in that area. 6 2 Some of the
poorest, forest-dependent families follow the logging trail to reforestation
sites near new logging blocks. They construct dwellings of teak leaves and
bark or apply to occupy tiny wooden houses constructed by the SFC as
56. Interviews with State Forestry Corporation officials, in Java (Apr.-May 1985) (notes on
file with the author).
57. See, e.g., Perum Perhutani supra note 44, at 8.
58. Atmosoedarjo, supra note 28, at 73.
59. Interview with M. Bratamihardja, in Jakarta (May 15, 1985) (notes on file with the
author).
60. Calculated from Perum Perhutani, supranote 44, at 37-38,90.
61. Interviews in Cepu Forest District (June 1985) (notes on file with the author).
62. See Peluso, supra note 4, at 210-11.
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part of their forest village welfare programs. 63 Other men follow logging
operations as work moves to new blocks. These seasonal or shorter-term
laborers migrate from their villages for a few weeks at a time. Sometimes
they bring their own rice, but usually they purchase food at local foodstalls. Sometimes they buy rice from the forest foremen and bear their own
subsistence and migration costs.64 As the production of teak becomes
more 'efficient' for the SFC, forest laborers bear more of the costs.
Except for being allowed to gather small-diameter branches from
felled teak trees, forest villagers who are not employed in cutting or hauling timber generally do not benefit from logging activities. Logging indirectly benefits those who can follow the logging, such as the few foodstall
operators who set up shop in the forest, traders who sell snacks there
daily, and itinerant gamblers and prostitutes.
Indonesia's recent focus on the development of non-oil resources
has caused the SFC to aggressively pursue a target of four percent annual
real growth.65 Normally, a teak forest or plantation is managed on an 80year rotation, that is, 1/80 of a teak forest district must be logged annually.
The SFC determines wood quotas based on expected incremental tree
growth. District managers must meet the quotas set down in ten, five, or
two year plans. Supplementary logging tracts are often added to the
detailed one-year plans to compensate for losses due to theft or damage to
standing stock caused by illegal grazing, forest fires, or vandalism. The
additional cuts come from forests that would not normally be logged that
66

year.

Both field and administrative foresters talk about the difficulties
of meeting quotas from certain tracts and the necessity of adding supplemental cuts year after year. In speaking of the sustainability of a management plan based on rotational planting and harvest, there can be no such
thing as a 'supplemental' tract in a forest. Cutting into a future tract means
depleting future stocks and reducing future income. In some districts
where trees older than 80 years remain, local foresters have somewhat
more leeway for supplemental cutting; nevertheless, a glance at Figure 1
will show that the proportion of trees in these mature classes compared to
63. These 30 m 2 houses, called magersarenand translated by the SFC as 'basecamps', were
constructed near selected reforestation sites in clusters of 12. When reforestation activities
were finished in a particular block (after a maximum time of five years), the wooden walls
were broken down for reconstruction elsewhere. As of 1986, the SFC began phasing out magersarens. Whereas the occupants were initially expected to protect the reforestation site and
the surrounding forest, the sites were viewed later as security risks.
64. On rare occasions, there is a shortage of logging labor in a district and a forest district
manager will pay the transportation costs of laborers from another district.
65. Perum Perhutani, supra note 44, at 7.
66. Interviews with foresters and field observations (Nov. 1984-Sept. 1985) (notes on file
with the author).
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the volume in all classes is quite small and that over-mature tracts are not
evenly distributed throughout the teak districts.
To meet quotas, mechanized means of extraction, usually chainsaws, are used in some teak districts to accelerate production, even though
67
rural labor is available and site conditions are suited to manual logging.
Manual logging is accomplished by pairs of men using nonmechanized
saws or by individuals using axes. Because fewer laborers are required to
operate chainsaws than hand saws, the labor foreman's task of supervi68
sion is easier. The practice, however, has a negative impact on labor.
Ironically, SFC officials in Jakarta and in several forest districts have stated
that the SFC has been encouraged by the government to use labor-intensive methods of exploitation where labor is in surplus, because industry,
the service sector, and agriculture cannot absorb all of the island's growing labor force. In practice, the SFC justifies using mechanized logging
techniques based on the foresters' concerns about wood
theft by loggers
69
and many foresters' contentions that labor is scarce.
De Facto Forest Conversion to Agriculture
The different types of land and resource management that occur
during the different stages in the 60- to 80-year rotation cycles of teak
plantations also affect the social and political sustainability of current forest management. Reforestation is by the taungya system, which a Dutch
70
forester introduced to Java in the latter years of the nineteenth century.
In exchange for the workers' labor in reforestation (including brush-clearing, planting, weeding, maintenance, and the application of any inputs to
their crops and thus to the trees), the SFC grants laborers
access to a forest
71
plot to grow agricultural crops for one to three years.
Taungya agroforestry is dominated by its agricultural components for the first one to three years after logging and then by its silvicultural components for the long-term (up to 78 years or more with teak).
During the first period, the forest farmer largely controls the land and his
or her daily activities determine the health of the trees. After the agricultural portion of the taungya period, de jure control returns to the foresters.
Because of their residential proximity to the forest, however, villagers
retain a great deal of de facto control over the trees, particularly over
whether the trees successfully mature. Because of the density of human
settlement in villages scattered throughout the teak forest, most taungya
farmers cannot move into freshly logged blocks after successfully reforest67. Interview with H. Simon (Nov. 25, 1984) (notes on file with the author).
68. Simon, supra note 50, at 91-93.
69. Id. at 68.
70. C. Lugt, Het Boschbeheer in Nederlandsche Indie 44 (1933); Peluso, supra note 4.
71. Interviews and observations, in Central Java (Noy. 1984-Sept. 1985) (notes on file with

the author).
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in the first
ing others. Thus, to retain farmland, they must keep the land 72
stages of reforestation, that is, prevent successful reforestation.
In taungya agroforestry, much of the forest land categorized as
age-class one is planted in a mixture of agricultural and tree crops, while
land categorized as age-classes two-twelve is usually dominated by teak
monocultures. The large amount of land in age-class one, shown in Figure
1,73 is a crude indicator of repeated reforestation failures. A 'normal' teak
forest structure should be evenly divided among age-classes. Some of the
skewed distribution of teak across the 10-year age-classes in an 80-year
rotation is a result of damage to the forest during wars and subsequent
political upheaval, as mentioned above. Most of the skew is due to reforestation efforts that have been purposely undermined by forest villagers.
Like the state, the peasants' goal has been to retain control over forest land
and their own labor. Peasants may keep forest plantations perpetually in
agriculture by clipping tree roots, pulling up seedlings, or burning down
the trees. The result of this conflict over control is that reforestation laborers or forest farmers have in74effect taken control of nine percent of state
forest lands in Central Java.
Village social systems also influence forest-based relations of production. Research in 1985 showed that the organization of labor on
taungya lands resembled that of adjacent agricultural lands. In many forest villages, including SFC community development villages, sharecropping, selling access rights to land to be reforested, and selling of taungya
agricultural crops in advance (ijon) were common. 75 In these ways, powerful villagers who informally control the distribution of reforestation
land and forest-produced agricultural products intervene in the official
structure of control between foresters and reforestation laborers. These
patterns of controlling access to forest land have implications not only for
the nature of state forest management, but also for the future roles of the
field foresters who have traditionally controlled access to the forests.
Thus, village internal politics and state-peasant relations are significantly
affecting the sustainability of Java's forests and forest management system.

72. For a more detailed discussion of this process in a village in Java, see Peluso, supra note
4, at 192-200, 146-47.
73. Reprinted with permission from the University of California Press.
74. See also Peluso, supra note 4, at 146. If forest land is kept under taungya for two-three
years, and 27-30 percent of productive teak land is in age-class one, then approximately nine
percent of productive teak forest land is controlled by reforestation laborers.
75. See, e.g., Tim Peneliti Social Forestry Indonesia, supra note 53, at 5; N. Peluso, Forest
and People in Kalinusu Central Java or "Border Issues": A Social Forestry Case Study 9
(1985). See also Peluso, supra note 4, at 173-77, 199, 200.
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"Timber Theft"
Timber theft, like the practices of overharvesting and interfering
with reforestation, threatens sustainable management. 'Timber theft'
includes a variety of diverse activities. Forest criminals include individuals who cut young trees for fuelwood, 'bandit' groups who work together
out of a village, and whole villages organized to feed wood into the black
market. Also included in this group are big-time black marketeers who
supply small-to medium-diameter logs to furniture makers and small
industry
industries. These latter marketeers supply the teak furniture
76
with an estimated 40 to 50 percent of their raw wood needs.
Teak theft is a form of resistance that has long been a crucial element of many villagers' survival strategies. Today, however, much stolen
teak finds its way into underground networks headed by criminals who
are not involved for the sake of household subsistence. The nature and
intentions of various actors are discussed elsewhere and go beyond the
scope of the present discussion. 77 Whatever the motive, however, teak
appropriation undermines state controls and eventually degrades the forest. Patches of forestland where trees have been stolen may regenerate,
but after the remaining trees are logged, long-term exposure of the forest
floor increases soil damage and reduces the potential productivity of teak
on that land. On sites where removal of trees by theft or soil compaction
from cattle grazing on reforestation tracts are recurrent problems, either
gnarly, deformed teak trees characterize the regrowth, the vegetative
cover has been removed, or the bedrock is exposed. 78 Though the contemporary political climate generally precludes overt opposition to state forest policies, the evidence of village resistance to state control is reflected in
the figures on teak theft and forest damage. As shown by Table 1, high levels of local resistance have characterized forest use since at least the turn of
79
the twentieth century.
While consistent accuracy of reporting of forest crimes is questionable, crimes may be under-reported given the political implications of
timber theft. Note the progressive rise in the number of forest crimes
recorded during the Depression years (1929-1939) and the continued high
rates of theft through the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. A sharp drop was noted
in 1966, the year when many forest squatters and laborers organized by
communist groups were killed in the agrarian war.80 In 1968, after the
76. Interviews with foresters, in Java (Oct.-Dec. 1984).
77. See Peluso, supra note 4, at 147-49 & ch. 7.
78. Interviews with field foresters, in Central Java (May-June 1985) (notes on file with
author).
79. See also Peluso, supra note 4, at 148.
80. Id. at 147. See generally D. Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia (1967); R. Mortimer, The Indonesian Communist Party and Land Reform (1972) (discussing the agrarian
war in Java).
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government formed smaller forest districts in some forests, the government also tightened security measures, but the effectiveness of these measures did not last. The 1969 and 1970 figures are for Central Java only.
Incidents of theft in 1984 dropped substantially, which the SFC credits to
the acceleration of repressive swat-team operations. However, by 1986,
the rate of theft had risen again.8 1
Overt opposition to the SFC surfaced more violently, albeit sporadically, between 1987 and 1989. Field foresters were killed by angry
groups of villagers using agricultural implements or machete-like knives
called parang.8 Such violent anti-government action has been rare in rural
Java since the New Order regime took power in 1967; it has been rarer still
where forest and civil control, through diverse arms of the state, are as
powerful as in the forest districts. Despite the differences between the
colonial and contemporary contexts of forest management (see below), the
violence against foresters indicates that rural people still view the SFC's
controls over the forest as a threat to their survival. The conflicting interexacerbated by the use of
ests of foresters and forest villagers have been
83
police.
forest
the
by
tactics
confrontational
CONTEMPORARY TRADITIONS OF ACCESS CONTROL
In some ways, the SFC differs significantly from its colonial predecessors. Among foresters, an ideology of pervasive nationalism has
combined with the broader, traditional forestry mandate to preserve and
protect state forests for production and conservation. In the past the Dutch
(and a few German advisors) served as managers, while Javanese employees were forest police and labor supervisors called boschgangers.Today, all
forest managers are Indonesian. During the colonial period and most of
the Sukarno period, 84 Forestry was a department within the Ministry of
Agriculture and the government administered the Forest Service's budget.85 In the early 1980s, Forestry was elevated to ministry status. Today,
by statute to conthe SFC is a non-stock public state enterprise mandated
86
tribute revenues to the state's development budget.
81. Peluso, supra note 4, at 147.
82. Interviews with foresters, in Java (Jan. 1987 and Aug. 1989) (notes on file with the
author). See also, 5 Suara Merdeka, 25 March 1986.
83. See Barber, supra note 10, at 228; Peluso, supra note 4, at 132-35.
84. In 1964, the Directorate General of Forestry was elevated to Ministerial status for a
brief period. In the initial years of Suharto's government, it was 'demoted' to a directorate
general. In 1981, it again became a ministry.
85. See Peluso, supra note 4, at 66 (explaining that from approximately 1930 to 1938, the
colonial foresters organized the teak forests under an autonomous "Teak Enterprise" (Djatibedriff)).
86. Peluso, supranote 4, at 125.

TABLE 1.

Number of Recorded Forest "Crimes," 1918-1984a
Total cases
(all forests)b

Tree theft only

No. of hectares

(cases/trees)c

damagedd

27,218

18,910

n/a

17,154

12,372

n/a

16,248

12,178

n/a

29,028

14,244

n/a

26,407

12,854

n/a

26,372

18,093

n/a

74,928

11,892

n/a

28,255

n/a

n/a

30,782

n/a

n/a

37,571

n/a

n/a

41,627

n/a

n/a

45,507

n/a

n/a

52,388

n/a

n/a

59,830

43,130

n/a

58,393

41,009

n/a

54,469

38,779e

n/a

52,528

37,189e

n/a

55,362

39,087e

n/a

41,102

263,699

12,945

49,147

165,662

25,433

35,200

177,257

13,069

36,809

221,470

24,844

21,311

109,258

6,663

28,447

157,837

38,865

22,170

97,553

3,851

10,596

n/a

12,682

14,641

41,826

7,741

TABLE 1, continued

Year

Total cases
(all forests)b

Tree theft only
(cases/trees)c

No. of hectares
danagedd

1974

n/a

153,838

9,461

142,622

9,733

132,738

44,908

127,806

43,269

1978

156,806

6,225

1979

203,702

28,451

19809

196,245

733

179,030

15,927

245,217

70,428

130,788

41,721

64,727

7,700

72,816

10,496

126,419

6,679

70,428

899

f

a. Table published in N. Peluso, Rich Forests, Poor People: Resource Control and Resistance in the Forests of Java (1992).
b. All types of crimes are combined here, including tree theft, damage to standing stock, illegal grazing, charcoal manufacture and transport, wood transport without a permit, forest conversion to agriculture, and collection of forest stones.
c. Figures from 1918 to 1932 indicate number of cases reported; from 1962 on, figures indicate number
of trees taken.
d. Damages include forest fires, unauthorized grazing and forest conversion to agriculture. They do
not include damages by natural disasters such as uprooting of trees during typhoons, etc.
e. Some early reports gave separate figures for teak and non-teak trees or cases. Most crimes were
recorded for teak forests although in the years that disaggregated statistics were available, the crimes in
non-teak forest accounted for as much as 25 percent of the total.
f. Prior to 1978, figures do not include West Java.
g. Figures for 1980 and 1987 through third quarter only.
SOURCES
Verslagen van den dienst van het Boschwezen in Nederlandsche-Indie over het jaar 1921-22, 1927, 1929, 1930,
1931, 1933-36, 1937, 1938-39, Batavia: Landsdrukkerij; Direktorat Djendral Kehutanan, Perusahaan
Kehutanan Negara, Perhutani, Statistik 1968, Djakarta; Direski Perhutani Jateng, Laporan Tahunan 1970,
Semarang: Perhutani, 1970; Perum Perhutani, Memori Serah Terima Direksi Perum Perhutani,Jakarta:
Perum Perhutani, 1981; Perun Perhutani, Proceeding Rapat ParipurnaPerum Perhutanitahun 1984, Buku 1:
Materi Rapat, Jakarta: Perum Perhutani, 1985. Memori Serah Terima Direksi Perum Perhutani, 1981-1987,
Jakarta: Perum Perhutani, 1987.
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Similarly, the political economy of teak today differs significantly
from that of prior periods. Raw logs now must be processed domestically
prior to export. The teak industry of Java has become integrated and the
relative quantity of teak exported has decreased. 8 7 The biophysical condition of the forest also differs from its condition under the Dutch. The SFC
inherited one fourth of Java's land area from the Dutch colonial foresters
and Sukarno's Forest Service. These lands and the trees had been damaged during a sequence of political upheavals, including the Japanese
occupation, the Indonesian Revolution, the Darul Islam uprising, Communist party unilateral actions, military tactics against political opponents, and individual 'attacks' on forest resources for subsistence. While
the government manages most of the forest as plantations, large areas
have still not been rehabilitated.
Despite the significant changes just discussed, the contemporary
SFC and its foresters still strongly resemble their colonial predecessors.
The SFC, like the colonial forest agency, is comprised of technical forestry
specialists, forest police, and administrators. As mentioned earlier, the
SFC and its historic counterparts are primarily concerned with the production of teak and other forest products. The SFC, like the colonial forest
service, is a business guided by principles of capitalist production for the
sake of the state.
In addition to the government's strong emphasis on revenues, the
SFC, like its predecessor, has been mandated to use ecologically sound
methods to produce forest products and protecting forests, known as scientific forest management, to market forest products, to allocate forest
labor, and to sponsor forest village development activities. 88 But also like
their colonial counterparts, contemporary foresters who implement forest
policy disdain local people's ecological knowledge and paternalistically
control all forestry and development activities. Both colonial and contemporary foresters have claimed that indigenous forest users are backward
and ignorant of 'the meaning and function of the forest.' They disregard
the political sophistication of forest-dwellers who recognize the nature of
the power struggle over forest control taking place. Foresters do not allow
the local people to participate in decisionmaking. Thus, structurally, the
relationship between contemporary foresters and forest villagers is in
many ways similar to their relationship during the colonial period.8 9
The state's mandates to promote development and provide for
social,welfare presently have the potential to alter those forestry practices
which adversely affect forest villagers. Unfortunately, in their implemen87. However, increasing exports of processed teak is currently a goal of forest planning.
88. Peluso, supra note 4, at 125; Barber, supra note 10, at 155-56.

89. Interviews with numerous contemporary foresters, in Java; and several former colonial foresters, in the Netherlands (Oct. 1984 - Jan. 1986) (notes on file with the author.)
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tation the SFC's mandates are themselves contradictory. The first, often
dominant, component of the corporation's mandate, territorial development, may easily confound the second, development of the people:
a. As a state corporation, the SFC is required to manage the forest using the most efficient forestry techniques in order to
achieve optimal productivity, emphasizing the efficiency of
production, industry, and marketing of forest products.
b. [To provide] service to the public interest which is manifested
in the conduct of territorial control duties which include the
tasks of90territorial development and the development of the
people.
These two clauses become contradictory when the government
interprets the 'public interest' in (b) as balancing the needs of the 'greater
good' against the needs of local communities and uses efficient forest
management techniques, as required in (a) to further its own interpretation of 'greater good' and 'public interest.' The Indonesian government
has consistently held that the needs of society at large are best met through
powerful, centralized management. The SFC, in particular, has not
emphasized local well-being or 'development of forest people,' partly
because local development requires diffusion or decentralization of management. Decentralization would require the SFC to release some of the
controls over the forests, which it has amassed historically.
Several factors have indirectly led the SFC to soften its own resistance to more 'social' approaches to forest management since the mid1980s. First, the peasants' resistance to SFC control threatens the future
productivity of the forests. Second, the Indonesian debt burden has
increased, 91 and consequently the government has become more susceptible to outside influences on internal policy. Because the present regime has
had a substantial ideological and financial commitment to development,
revenue losses due to declining oil prices have forced greater dependence
on outside sources to fund development. These outside sources have
brought with them a new international predilection for 'social forestry.'
This preference has influenced official policy and caused the SFC to
rethink its forest management and socio-economic development man92
dates.

90. D. Darmosoehardjo, Penguasaan Teritorial oleh Jajaran Perum Perhutani. PHT 50Seri Umum 23 at 1 (1986). See also Peluso, supra note 4, at 152; Barber, supranote 10 (providing
more extensive analyses of the origins of these mandates and their manifestation in the Java
social forestry program).
91. Tarrant et al., supra note 34, at 2. See also Barber, supra note 10, at 238.
92. See Peluso, supra note 4, at ch. 4. See also M. Poffenberger, Keepers of the Forest: Land
Management Alternatives for Southeast Asia (1990) (comparing the case of Java to other
Indonesian cases and to Southeast Asian Social Forestry programs in general).
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CONTROLLING SOCIAL FORESTRY
Social forestry did not emerge on the Indonesian forestry scene in
a vacuum; it was preceded by 'community forestry' and what the Indonesian foresters called "the Prosperity Approach." 9 3 Both of these
approaches were meant to increase the income farmers could earn from

state-controlled forest lands and from their own lands. "Forests for People," which emphasized the importance of using forests to serve the needs

of rural people worldwide, was the theme of the Eighth World Forestry
Congress, held in 1978 in Jakarta. A great deal of discussion at the congress centered around the importance of forests in meeting rural people's
building materials, fiber, and income
basic needs for fuel, fodder, food,
94
producing non-timber products.
Until 1984, the SFC had implemented forest community development projects largely on its own.9 5 In the most recent of these programs,
called the PMDH,9 6 the SFC annually invested some five percent of the
corporation's net earnings in its own projects.9 7 Despite these rather substantial financial supports, the projects rarely went beyond the pilot
project stage in most villages, and most failed to either alleviate poverty or
ameliorate degraded forest lands as had been intended. Some failures

were clearly attributable to the isolation of projects. Some failures were
due to structural flaws which prevented the projects from addressing both
short and long-term needs of the village poor.98 More importantly, the
projects failed to change the nature of SFC control and the terms of forest

access for local people.
The 'problem,' as Indonesian foresters see it, with implementing
'true' social forestry is involving local people in management decisionmaking. The involvement of local people in forest management decisions
goes against the grain of traditional, top-down forestry practiced by pro93. See, e.g., S. Atmosoedarjo, The Community Development Program in the Forests of
Central and East Java, An Evaluation of its Merits and Prospects (1977) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the State Forestry Corporation, Jakarta). See also Barber, supra note 10, at
229-37 (explaining in detail the origins of the Prosperity Approach and its relations to subsequent community or social forestry programs in Indonesia).
94. See, e.g., Westoby, supra note 1, at 3-70 (discussing the history of 'forestry for development' approaches, particularly within the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization).
95. The Prosperity Approach, under the SFC's first president director, lasted from 1973
through 1981, while the Forest Community Development Program (PembangunanMasyarakat
Desa Hutan or PMDH) began in 1982. The current social forestry program was subsumed
under the Forest Community Development Program in 1985. See Hartono WirJodarmodjo,
Perum Perhutani, Memori Serah Terima Direksi Perum Perhutani 1981-1987 at 59-60 (1987).
See generally Peluso & Poffenberger, supra note 2, at 333-43; Barber, supra note 10, at 224-37
(discussing the early history of the social forestry program in Java).
96. PMDH translates as "Forest Village Community Development."
97. Interview with M. Bratamihardja, in Jakarta (Sept. 25, 1985) (notes on file with the
author).
98. Peluso & Poffenberger, supranote 2, at 335.
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fessionals. 99 To include local people in decisionmaking, the SFC would
have to change not only the rules for forest access and use, but also its own
view of the forest villagers' capacity to participate in forest management.
Changing the patterns of people's uses of the forest, e.g., by allowing them
to plant fruit trees or medicinal plants, requires allowing them greater
access and thus control. Fruit trees require longer production periods. To
implement this type of social forestry program, the SFC would have to
adjust its use of large-scale, single-species production of timber and other
forest products for the benefit of the state and the state's narrowly defined
'public interest.'
Like foresters in general, the SFC has resisted the social forestry
philosophy, although the SFC rarely reveals its resistance openly. In contemporary social forestry programs, sponsored jointly by the Ford Foundation and the SFC, the SFC has relinquished some control and given
forest farmers access to the forest in the form of tree and crop usufruct
rights. Officially allowing taungya farmers to plant fruit trees on state forest lands and to retain access to the products of those trees throughout the
life of the trees is an unprecedented policy change in nearly 200 years of
state forestry in Java. Forest farmers may now plant horticultural crops on
forest lands, retain longer tenure over the produce of fruit and fodder
trees, and retain access for planting different crops under agroforestry
regimes. 100 In general, however, the SFC has relinquished decisionmaking
control on paper only and in many sites has implemented the new program merely as a more humane form of the taungya system.
The SFC began to implement the current social forestry program
in 1986 after a year of diagnostic research on the forestry-related problems
faced by forest villagers. 10 1 Social forestry farmers have greater incentives
to participate in the program because the rights of land and tree access
that they gain are extended over longer periods. For example, under the
original taungya system, as discussed, farmers used the land for two to
three years. Ideally, under the new program, the farmers can lease forest
land for two to five years, depending on the site, and if organized in
groups called KTH (Kelompok Tani Hutan, literally, "Forest Farmers'
Groups"), they can extend their access rights for 15 to 60 years. The length
of extended access depends on the rotation cycle of the principal forest
species, such as teak, mahogany, or pine. Continued access to forest land
also depends on the farmers' willingness to adapt annual and perennial
crops to the changing light and space regimes determined by the primary
99. See Fortmann & Fairfax, supra note 29, at 106; Fortmann, supranote 1, at 49-50.
100. See Peluso & Poffenberger, supra note 2; Barber, supranote 10; Seymour, supranote 10
(all discussing various parts of the initial social forestry project, the preceding diagnostic
research, and the expansion of the pilot projects).
101. See Tim Peneliti Social Forestry Indonesia, supra note 53, at 1-49; Peluso, supra note

53, at 1059 (reporting on the results of the diagnostic research).
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forest crop. At the same time farmers are supposed to have a major
10 2 role in
deciding what horticultural and shade tolerant species to plant.
The SFC and forest farmer groups entered into contracts, indicating the location of each farmer's plot and the mix of crops to be grown. As
part of the agreement, farmers had no rights to transfer these lands or the
perennial trees through sale or inheritance. The SFC defined access as usufruct rights (to the trees' non-timber products) so that notions of farmer
ownership of trees or land, unacceptable to the SFC, would not complicate
the agency's long-term plans for the forest plantation. Similarly, the SFC
retained the power to veto any horticultural species that would threaten
the survival of the primary tree crop species. In the early stages, the local
foresters predetermined acceptable alternating crops; the foresters did not
permit many of the more expensive fruits, such as mango, because the
mango's broad canopy would shade out desired forest species such as
teak.j 3 Moreover, the SFC, not the farmer or the forest farmer group,
determined the placement of horticultural and fuelwood trees. In this
way, the SFC retained control over both the forest and horticultural species planted on forest land.
Usufruct rights are a key element of the contracts. The people
were primarily interested in retaining ownership of their horticultural
trees. However, traditionally in some Javanese villages, planting trees
indicated that the planter claimed the land. Therefore, the SFC insisted on
providing the seedlings for horticultural tree crops planted on state lands.
By providing the seedlings, the SFC could retain control of the woody
parts of the commercial tree species. In other words, the farmers plant the
trees but the state technically owns them. The products harvested from the
tree for the life of the tree belong to the farmers. Because the SFC owns the
tree, when the SFC harvests its timber, an entire tract, including the social
forestry species, could be clearcut. The farmers' rights to the horticultural
products are literally cut off. Implicit in this agreement was the idea that if
forest farmers successfully cared for a tract of forest, the SFC would award
the forest farmer group first options on newly opened reforestation
land.1 04
As a result of social forestry, the role of the field forester is changing in two ways. The field forester (mantri)traditionally acted as a forest
guard and as the lowest-level manager of territory in the corporate hierarchy. Now the field forester must also act as a community organizer, helping the forest farmers to form management groups to plan for certain
102. Peluso & Poffenberger, supra note 2, at 340.
103. Carol Stoney is completing research on appropriate agroforestry crops for use in
social forestry areas.
104. This is apparently still being negotiated, with ideas of selective cutting of primary
species being considered by SFC planners. Interview with C. Stoney (Oct. 10,1991) (notes on
file with the author).
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tracts of reforestation land. 10 5 Conversely, the new community-based programs in turn have increased the field foresters' power by increasing the
value of access to forestland. 10 6
The initial conception of the social forestry alternative did not
suppose this expanded role for field foresters. The original plan called for
the deployment of neutral community organizers recruited from outside
the SFC apparatus. 107 However, neutral community organizers cost
money-more than the SFC was willing to spend to place community
organizers in every forest village. 108 In negotiating the future of the program, the state substituted SFC foresters as community organizers in the
permanent program configuration to reduce the SFC's costs.
Two different types of impacts have resulted from using SFC foresters as community organizers. First, in many forest areas, the program
has resulted in successful tree-planting. 10 9 Second, field foresters now
play contradictory roles: as forest police and as community organizers. In
spite of the obvious difficulties with such an arrangement, the use of field
foresters as village development agents has substantially improved the
negative image of the SFC among villagers. 110 Many forest farmers at
social forestry sites perceive SFC foresters as helping rather than thwarting the farmers' use of the forest. Field foresters most directly feel the
changes in community relations. 1 The change in the field foresters' roles
from full-time custodial antagonists to part-time community organizers
has the potential to stimulate the foresters' continued support and optimism in the face of practical difficulties. Moreover, district managers who
view the new social forestry program as a cure for the problem sites in
their district, have eagerly sought to be included, increasing the program's
vertical support system.
Despite the growing enthusiasm for social forestry within certain
divisions of the SFC, the SFC has had some problems in implementing
social forestry programs. These problems are largely due to the difficulties
mainstream foresters have had in giving up traditional forms of power
discussed earlier. The first problem in implementation occurred when the
SFC chose the most degraded lands for the program and selected maize as
105.
106.
107.
108.

Barber, supra note 10, at 281; Peluso & Poffenberger, supranote 2, at 340.
Peluso, supra note 4, at 239, 247.
See Peluso & Poffenberger, supra note 2, at 338-39.
Interviews with Perum Perhutani officials (Jan.-Feb. 1987) (notes on file with the

author).
109. Many observers interviewed by the author in October 1992 concur that the most successful aspect of the 'new' social forestry program is in the production of forest species for

the SFC.
110. See, e.g., M. Bratamihardja, Laporan Pelaksanaan Program Perhutani Sosial Forestry
Tahap 1 Tahun 1986 at 39-40 (1987).
111. Interviews with field foresters, in Java (Jan. 1987 and Oct. 1991) (notes on file with the
author).
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the most appropriate agroforestry species. The second and most difficult
problem in implementing the program occurred when wealthy villagers
displace subsistence farmers in the program. These processes are discussed in the following section.
TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS:
CHOICES OF LAND AND SPECIES
Initially, optimistic forestry officials attempted to convince their
more skeptical counterparts that social forestry could benefit the SFC.
They targeted the most degraded lands for the pilot projects and early
expansion stages. On degraded lands, the SFC had the least to lose: many
of these lands did not produce commercially valuable species for the SFC
and had not for years. The SFC's definition of degraded lands included,
for example, sites with severely eroded or leached soils and sites prone to
landslides. It also included forest lands under peasant agriculture which
had been repeatedly targeted for reforestation because earlier reforestation efforts had failed.
In the case of physically degraded land, the SFC's problems
stemmed from the false hope that a collaborative management approach
alone could solve difficult biophysical problems. The choice of physically
degraded lands imposed enormous silvicultural constraints on the social
forestry program which was meant to experiment with new forms of
social organization in forest production. Nevertheless, even after consultants raised the issue in evaluative reports and internal planning meetings,
112
more degraded lands were selected as sites for expansion.
For example, in May 1988, a year after the program began to
expand, a field worker wrote that some forty percent of the new sites visited had extremely degraded soils or else were located too far from villages. In addition, four out of five of the original pilot sites visited were
plagued by depleted soils, erosion, landslides, and failed harvests. Some
sites consisted of little more than exposed bedrock. At other sites, where
the growth of the forest species had significantly improved, the farmers'
agricultural crops failed.3 Foresters had difficulty recruiting farmers to
work such degraded lands, despite the promises of extended tenure. Poor
farmers could ill afford the extensive labor inputs and expensive fertilizers; middle-class and elite farmers had little incentive to participate.
112. See, e.g., N. Peluso, Social Forestry in Java, An Evaluation (1987) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Ford Foundation, Jakarta); Tim Peneliti Social Forestry Indonesia, supra
note 53; V. Read, Reflections on Selected Pilot Sites of the Java Social Forestry Program
(1988)(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Ford Foundation, Jakarta) (giving specific
examples of the problems experienced by these pilot projects).
113. Read, supra note 112, at 1.
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Where physical degradation had been caused by socioeconomic pressures
and SFC-village conflict, the SFC's
choice of such poor sites was viewed
n4
with disdain by the villagers.
Farmers did not participate as actively in selecting agroforestry
species as project designers had intended. A national government program to become self-sufficient in maize superseded the participation components of social forestry as discussed earlier. Agriculture officials
pressured SFC officials to support the maize self-sufficiency program. Foresters also felt obligated to support the maize production program
because they depended on agricultural extension agents to assist in other
aspects of social forestry. Thus, although the SFC had decided to let farmers choose their field crops, they subsequently required farmers in most
sites to plant hybrid varieties of maize (high yielding varieties, or HYV),
using chemical fertilizers and pesticides. If farmers1 did
not comply, the
5
SFC excluded them from participating in some sites. 1
Through established state programs for HYV inputs and credit,
the SFC loaned participants the HYV maize seeds, chemical fertilizers,
and pesticides just prior to the onset of the rainy season. Yields varied
widely. In a few areas, a few farmers harvested four to five tons of hybrid
maize per hectare, two to three times what they had achieved with local
varieties on surrounding private farmlands. However, in areas with poor
soils, most of the pilot sites, the hybrid maize did poorly. Some district
managers permitted farmers to choose their crops the next season, but
most managers bowed to the pressures of their colleagues in the Ministry
of Agriculture and the provincial government, and required farmers to
plant HYV maize for several subsequent seasons. 116 Thus, the broader
political imperatives of national food production strategies superseded
the participatory principles of social forestry.
Technical considerations also restricted the farmers' choice of
perennials. Thus, when a forest farmer group presented its management
proposal to the district office, the proposal was not the result of negotiation. The plans reflected local foresters' suggestions, based on evolving
SFC social forestry policy, as discussed earlier. Moreover, the SFC had
imposed a schedule for completing plans that did not allow time for significant negotiations. The field forester had to prepare local management
plans for every reforestation tract, indicating the species to be planted, the
method, and so on, as quickly as possible. In social forestry tracts, the forest plan had to indicate the species of fruit trees and their placement on a
map of the tract. These plans were generally due in at the district office
114. Peluso, supra note 112, at 19.
115. Interviews with farmers and foresters, in Java (Jan. 1987 and Oct. 1991) (notes on file
with the author).
116. Read, supranote 112, at 2.
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months or weeks before the field forester met with the forest farmer group
to discuss the upcoming social forestry plans. As a result, the planning
done by forest farmers in the group often amounted to no more than
agreeing to plant what the local forester had planned." 7 Consequently,
many forest villagers see the 'new' social forestry program as simply an
extension of the SFC's traditional, top-down approach to forest management. The program has, in fact, reinforced some forest villagers' convictions that the latter's overriding interest in maintaining
forest control
118
ultimately limits the potential for change in the SFC.
SOCIAL PROCESSES AT THE LOCAL LEVEL
Prior to the new social forestry program, the lands kept under
taungya by the resistance of forest farmers to state control of the forests
were a constant source of anxiety for SFC foresters. 119 These lands often
produced good agricultural yields for the farmers. 120 However, because
timber-producing trees or other forest species (such as resin-producing
trees) would not grow there, the SFC had classified these lands as 'critical
lands.' The social forestry program gave hope to foresters that such lands
would soon be reforested. In fact, compared to the failed attempts to get
farmers to reforest physically degraded sites, recent evaluations of the
sites by the author, as well as by program observers at the Bogor Agricultural University, found that reforestation of the lands over which the foresters had lost control was the single greatest success of the social forestry
program. This illustrates the foresters' success in renegotiating or reestablishing their own control over forest lands.
Traditionally, both cultural and professional constraints drove
many field foresters to allocate reforestation land to willing middle-class
and wealthy peasants. These constraints included the class connections of
the field forester with wealthier and more powerful forest villagers and
the pressure on each forester, imposed by his superiors, to reforest the territory he controlled. 12 1 As in agricultural development projects, the
patron-client relations that evolve between the state and wealthy peasants
in forest development projects differ from those that evolve between the
state and poorer rural people. 2 2 In forest development projects, the poor
117. Interviews with foresters (Oct. 1991) (notes on file with the author).
118. Interviews with members of Indonesian non-governmental organizations (Oct. 1991)
(notes on file with the author).
119. See Peluso, supra note 4, at ch. 6 (demonstrating the various rationales and motives
for peasants of different classes to sabotage reforestation efforts and keep land under
taungya).
120. Id. at 168.
121. Id. at 242.
122. Id. at 240. See also G. Hart, Power, Labor, and Livelihood 38-42 (1986) (discussing the
ways in which the state has co-opted the loyalties of village leaders, particularly by structurally integrating them into the civil service).
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become direct clients of both the state and its agents, the field foresters.
The poor in forest regions are often relatively powerless. Being dependent
on the forest for both formal and informal sources of income, they are
more susceptible to individual exploitation by either local foresters or
local elites. Because of the consummate power of the field forester over the
forest, the poor are largely dependent on the goodwill of the field forester
for obtaining access to land and labor opportunities. So far, the SFC, like
other arms of the state, refuses either to take responsibility for the exploitation of poor forest villagers or to try to prevent it by structuring the
social forestry program in a manner that favors poor farmers over elites.
Local people of different classes, who were active resisters, have
been co-opted into being laborers for the state. 123 The high returns possible from the conversion of forest land to agriculture and from the sale of
both trees and other products on that land make access rights to the forest
a valuable commodity, and thus more attractive to better-off farmers. Better-off farmers can take control of social forestry or other taungya lands:
either directly through allocations by local foresters as mentioned or indirectly through the farmers' existing social relationships with the poorer
forest farmers. As a result, when the state is relaxing its control over land
and species, the structure of the labor force will become more of an issue.
Middle and upper-income farmers often become more entrenched in the
system, and have much to gain both on and off the forest lands by maintaining their position. Poor villagers, on the other hand, may remain
dependent on better-off villagers for access to reforestation lands through
sharecropping or leasing, or become more dependent on the patronage of
local foresters.
Evaluations held two years and seven years after the onset of the
pilot program found that the social forestry program has not entirely alleviated the professional pressures on field foresters.124 On some sites, the
SFC district officer has imposed a condition limiting project participation
to households controlling less than a quarter-hectare of private agricultural land. This condition effectively precludes from participation most
farmers with sufficient land of their own. On other sites, however, the SFC
has stressed the need to rapidly reforest the sites but has not provided
adequate structural supports for poor farmers. Under these conditions,
some local foresters have fallen back on their traditional practice of selecting farmers they label as 'more diligent.' These farmers, very frequently,
are the better-off farmers.
Foresters often select better-off farmers to replace poor farmers
who drop out of the program.125 Better-off farmers, who have some sav123. See Peluso, supra note 4, at 23941.
124. Peluso, supranote 112; N. Peluso, Excerpts from the Evaluation of the Java Social Forestry Program 8 (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Ford Foundation, New
York).
125. InterViews with foresters (Jan. 1987 and Oct. 1991) (notes on file with the author).
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ings or access to credit (to pay labor), can participate in the program even
though income is delayed, whereas poorer villagers need daily wages to
survive.126 In 1989, the SFC introduced a new subsidy program to support
127
participants through the six months from first clearing to harvest.
Despite the subsidy, once the tree canopy has closed, blocking the area for
growing field crops, better-off farmers still have the advantage over
poorer farmers. Because the SFC strictly limits the number and placement
of fruit trees on a social forestry plot, farmers can not earn enough money
from their fruit trees to subsist or contribute substantially to the household budget. The income, though perhaps an important addition to the
household economy, is supplemental, not basic. Poor farmers, who
depend on crops from the forest land for subsistence must seek labor
opportunities elsewhere and often are willing to sell their social forestry
plots for quick cash.128 Thus, even where poor farmers are selected for
participation, they are weeded out by either the economic burden of cultivating the land or the low yields from the poor quality sites.
Though plots are not legally supposed to be transferred, foresters
do not prevent transfer. Foresters are interested in assuring that the trees
grow, whoever plants them. 129 Many forest farmers transfer their rights of
tenure to other village farmers within the first year; the same pattern continues in subsequent years. In one site, only five or slightly more than 20
percent of the original 18 participants did not drop out by the end of the
second year; in another, only 20 percent of the original families remained
through the first two years. 130 These transfers are reminiscent of the
same
131
types of transfer prevailing under the traditional taungya system.
For example, many sites designated as social forestry sites require
very high labor inputs. At a fertile, but overgrown, site visited in 1987,
farmers and the field forester had monitored their labor inputs and found
that as many as 114-person days were required to prepare a quarter-hectare plot for planting.1 32 Elite farmers, who could hire laborers to work the
farmers' privately owned fields, could work the forest plots. Many poor
farmers who tried to participate eventually transferred their plots to farm126. Interviews with forest farmers and field foresters, in Java (Jan. 1987 and Oct. 1991)
(notes on file with the author).
127. Interview with F.Seymour, Ford Foundation Program Officer, inJakarta (Oct. 7,1991)
(notes on file with the author).
128. Interviews with forest farmers and field foresters, in Central Java, East Java and
Jakarta (Jan. 1987 and Oct. 1991) (notes on file with the author).
129. Cf. Peluso, supra note 4, at 195-99 (relating a similar attitude among Javanese field
foresters prior to the implementation of the social forestry program). See also Fortmann, supra
note 2, at 51 (arguing that social forestry requires foresters "to expand their technical repertoire[s] by planting 'strange' trees in 'strange' places for 'strange' purposes ....Id.)
130. Read, supranote 112, at 3.
131. See, e.g., lim Peneliti Social Forestry Indonesia, supra note 53, at 5; Peluso, supra note
4, at 174-75.
132. See Peluso, supranote 112, at 44-46.
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ers who could afford to hire labor. The SFC did not discourage hired labor
if the farmer paid for it, but the SFC would not subsidize labor.133 The
unacknowledged prerequisite to participation in the social forestry program, thus, was access to independent capital to pay laborers or to support the household through the first six months.
In some instances, participation for the poor was possible only
through a great deal of risk and sacrifice. For example, one landless farmer
sold his only cow and took a loan at 10 percent monthly interest to pay
laborers to help him clear the thick brush on the plots. He was fortunate to
be working where the forest soils were conducive to growing the hybrid
maize such that he earned enough to finance a second crop that year without credit. Other farmers worked mornings for wages on private agricultural lands or in a nearby town. They cleared their taungya plots in the
afternoons and evenings.P3 4 SFC officials held up as the norm rather than
the exception these few poor farmers who were successful despite difficulties. Foresters said those who could not bear the burden or dropped out of
the program were lazy or misinformed.13 5 In this manner, the foresters
turned two of the key goals of the program-higher rural income and
lower forest dependence-into
qualifications for access to opportunities
136
to work social forestry plots.
After seven years' implementation, familiar patterns of both labor
displacement, even where foresters were enthusiastic about the program,
and isolated incidents of exploitation, were evident. For many foresters in
the SFC, the objective of the social forestry program is to organize a group
of forest farmers to grow trees on SFC land. When poorer participants lose
their access to forest land and revert to wage labor for subsistence the foresters are not concerned. It does not matter to the foresters who grows the
trees. It does not matter that a village-based collective approach to forest
management and rural resource management develops within forest
farmer groups. What matters is the number of trees planted and the number that survive.13 7 The state's traditional orientation toward forest production for national development has thus overpowered
the institutional
1 38
changes which form the heart of social forestry.
133. There are new subsidies available to remunerate the labor in terracing (interview
with C. Stoney, October 7, 1991), but these do not cover the kinds of costs mentioned here,
i.e., those costs that might be considered routine such as forest clearing, deep hoeing to
extract deeply rooted imperata grass, etc.
134. These two examples come from interviews conducted by the author with foresters,
in East Java (Jan.-Feb. 1987) (notes on file with the author).
135. Interviews with foresters, in Java (Feb. 1987) (notes on file with the author).
136. See Blaikie, supranote 25, at 110 (defining "access qualifications").
137. Cf. Barber, supra note 10, at 385 (arguing that trees are not important to foresters
charged with social forestry, but the reporting process is the key).
138. Conclusion based on author's interviews in Jakarta and West Java, October 1991
(notes on file with author).
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The foresters' predominant interest in growing trees also has
afflicted women's formal access to the program. The SFC's system of allocating tenure rights to household heads-always defined as the male in a
two parent family-systematically excludes their wives. Only the household head signs contracts granting long-term rights to the products of the
trees in the agroforestry program. These rights are personal to the household head and do not create household tenure. 139 The government does
not formally permit inheritance rights, like other forms of transfer. The
husband cannot transfer his rights to the trees during his life or by will
after he dies. Thus, the terms of individual tenure mean that if the husband dies, moves, or loses interest in the project, his wife has no formal
claims to the tree products, even if she has planted the tree and is its primary caretaker.
The SFC's hesitance to grant tree rights to the household as an
entity stems from the SFC's old fears of challenges to its control. 140 The
SFC particularly worries about potential conflicts in property claims
which could arise when the SFC schedules the main forest crop for logging. If the farmers' fruit trees are still producing at that time, the farmers
may oppose logging. By terms of the contract, if the husband loses or
relinquishes his rights to fruit trees, these rights to fruit trees revert to the
forest farmer group which reallocates the trees as it sees fit. Recent reports
from the field indicate that forest farmer groups have tended to allocate a
husband's rights to his wife, should the husband leave the project or
die.141 Thus, social pressures at the village level may supersede the formal
structures of the state-controlled project. Nevertheless, though the group
is likely to allocate rights to the wife or a child, they are not legally bound
to do so. For the long-term, therefore, security of tree tenure for the household, not just the household head, remains an unresolved issue.
Social pressures have not prevented field foresters from systematically excluding female-headed households at the time members of the
forest farmer groups are selected. Sometimes, if a female-headed household includes a teenage boy who the forester regards as capable of brush
clearing, then the field forester will give the household's tree rights nominally to the female head of household. Field foresters remain reluctant to
risk situations that they perceive to be at risk of failure. The myth that
'women can not do the job' persists, even in sites where women have
clearly participated in traditional taungya and have consistently participated in or dominated agricultural labor. The myth, however, is less a
product of reality among poor forest villagers than a projection of the for139. Interviews with foresters, in Java Uan.-Feb. 1987 and Oct. 1991) (notes on file with
the author).
140. See, e.g., Peluso, supra note 4, at chs. 2,3,4 (describing the evolution of the state's institutional controls on the forest and its products).
141. Interviews with foresters (Oct. 1991) (notes on file with the author).
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esters' own experience. Most foresters' wives are middle or upper class
(albeit usually of rural origins) themselves, and do not engage in manual
labor. Moreover, under the present regime, 142
a woman's economic role is
presumed to be secondary to her husband's.
The SFC has not sufficiently considered the potential value, from
the peasant's point of view, of maintaining the status quo under certain
circumstances. For example, the peasants often have more to gain by
maintaining the status quo in areas where reforestation has repeatedly
failed but agriculture is viable. 143 For both short-term and long-term subsistence needs, field crops such as dry rice, maize, groundnut, and cassava
are more appealing than tree crops to local people. Food yields are more
critical to the forest-dependent farmer in many forest villages, which suffer from uncertain economic climates and insufficient sources of off-farm
income. Other contradictions concern the field foresters' ability to recruit
better-off peasant farmers. As mentioned above, better-off villagers do not
depend on forestland for subsistence. Thus, they are better positioned economically to participate in social forestry programs with agroforestry
regimes that involve longer periods between planting and realizing profits. At the same time, these better-off peasants, already more powerful in
terms of private resource control, are the most capable of working against
the program and retaining their controls on increasingly valuable forest
resources. Not only can the better-off farmers generate resentment among
the poorer villagers towards the foresters, better-off villages can also sabotage SFC efforts to reforest, where it is in the better-off farmers' interest to
keep those lands under (their) control for agricultural uses. 144 Therefore,
unless local foresters successfully involve the poor, the social forestry program will fail to reduce the dependence of the poor on the forest, and thus
45
increase the income gaps between village elites and the village poor.1
Despite difficulties of implementation, the traditional tensions
between forest villagers and state foresters have relaxed considerably
where the SFC has begun social forestry programs. 4 6 It remains to be seen
whether the economic benefits, particularly the desired equity effects of
social forestry, will reinforce this trend, overcome bureaucratic resistance
142. Thus, the tendency on the census to mark the husband's occupation as 'farmer' while
the wife's occupation is 'housewife' or 'farmer's wife,' no matter what percentage of the
actual farm labor is done by either.
143. This situation was documented in many forest villages even before the current social
forestry program started. See, e.g., Peluso, supra note 53, at 11.
144. See Peluso, supra note 4, at ch. 6.
145. Again, these trends were found in taungya sites studied during the diagnostic
research. See Tim Peneliti Social Forestry Indonesia, supra note 53; Peluso, supra note 53, at

14-15.
146. Author's interviews and observations (Jan.-Feb. 1987 and Oct. 1991). See also Seymour, supra note 10, at 10; Barber, supra note 10, at 398-99; J, Kartasubrata, Review of Community Forestry Programs in Indonesia (1988) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Ford
Foundation, Jakarta).
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to the social forestry program, and succeed in including targeted villages
as real partners in the development process. The alternative scenario
bodes ill for the future of 'truly social' forestry in Java. If social forestry
does not serve the needs of poor forest farmers, poor peasants will have
no incentive to stop sabotaging reforestation sites and stealing teak to survive. In effect, in order to gain control on a broad scale, the foresters must
release more of their traditional controls on land, labor, and the reforestation process at the local level.
Indonesia's social forestry program has not altered established
patterns of timber extraction and forest management on those millions of
hectares of forest not programmed for social forestry. Traditional relations
of production and coercive forms of forest protection remain in middleaged to mature tracts of forest. The contradiction between the new social
forestry and the old custodial forestry in Java's forest management structure may represent the most serious threat to social forestry. Admittedly, it
is far more difficult for international pressure to transform the entire structure of state forestry than to add and subsidize a social forestry component. 147 Moreover, Indonesia's national development priorities continue
to strongly influence the SFC's decisionmaking processes, despite the participation goals of the social forestry program.1 ' Specific national priorities include developing non-oil resources, establishing food selfsufficiency, and ensuring that the SFC finances its own costs and pays
taxes into Indonesia's Development Budget. Given these priorities, the
SFC will probably resist change most in the more valuable forests, if not in
all of them.

CONCLUSION
In this paper I have shown how local and national processes
already have limited the intended objectives of international institutions
and philosophies of social forestry. Social forestry programs in Java have,
in effect, resulted in little more than new configurations of old state controls. I have shown how forest-based peasants have responded to these
new configurations. This analysis provides a backdrop against which analysts and others can view the future outcomes of this and other social forestry programs.
Although this paper has presented a case study of social forestry
programs in Java from 1986 to 1991, it has illuminated several issues relevant to forest management elsewhere in the world. These issues include:
the cultural, political, and economic unsustainability of current plantation
147. Fortmann, supranote 1, at 51.
148. See Barber, supra note 10, at 398; Seymour, supra note 10, at 22.
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forestry practices, the reasons for and means of distorting the concept of
social forestry, the roles played by social institutions in determining access
to finite renewable resources, and the reasons for the success or failure of
social forestry programs.
Current forestry practices are unsustainable largely due to factors
external to the plantation planning procedure. Foresters in Java apply the
principles of sustained yield much more seriously in plans for forest plantations than do foresters in the United States for private timber land. However, these technical principles are confounded by political factors outside
the forest, particularly high population pressure and extreme inequality in
rural income and employment distribution. Social forestry, the new
taungya as it were, has not sufficiently addressed the equity issues. As a
result, forest villagers, many of whom are plagued by persistent poverty,
continue to compete with each other and village elites for authorized and
unauthorized access to valuable forest resources. Poor forest villagers are
vulnerable to exploitation by local foresters and better-off villagers, while
foresters and elite villagers, in effect, have become even stronger rural
patrons.
The development ethic of the state, when conceived in terms of
short-term economic growth, has also rendered real sustained yield in forestry a shadow value.-Foresters are forced to overextract their raw materials, drawing from future supplies to meet the demand for growth in the
forestry sector. Secondary processing cannot add enough value fast
enough to reduce the need for large quantities of raw logs. Perhaps here
the economic growth demands of the state impose most viciously on the
scientific professionalism of the state forester. Combined with the
demands of the 'forest-dependent villager,' the demands of a regional and
national 'forestry-dependent political economy' batter the state forestry
agency's multipurpose mandates for forest protection.
Powerful social and environmental forces operating at national
and local levels everywhere will inevitably distort the international social
forestry ideal of involving or empowering local people in forest management. Social foresters must analyze the forces governing a state forestry
agency's policies, whether a parastatal like the SFC or a forest service, in
conjunction with the forces governing the interactions between forest
communities and field foresters and those operating within the villages
themselves. Only then can they develop means for accommodating these
forces in forest policy and programs.
As social forestry programs evolve, two processes are likely to
occur: First, both the objectives and processes of change in social forestry
programs are likely to be renegotiated within existing social structures by
local actors, such as the field forester, the better-off farmer, and the poor
farmers. This process is most likely to occur where social forestry pro-
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grams do not or cannot change power relations sufficiently to include forest-dependent people in decisionmaking or where these programs, by
changing power relations, exclude powerful actors.
Second, forestry professionals will resist new institutional and
power relations, focusing instead on new technologies and species mixes.
Resistance will most often occur where a new generation of field and
administrative foresters trained in social forestry has yet to receive authority. The current generation of foresters was chosen for their jobs and,
indeed, may have gravitated to forestry for reasons other than community
organizing and social reform. Social foresters are still in the minority, with
very few in positions of power. Professional praises and promotions for
field foresters still center on whether a forester was successful in planting
trees, increasing productivity, or saving money, not on whether he was
successful in organizing groups of farmers and improving their welfare.
As social forestry programs expand, both the social and the ecological
aspects of the foresters' role in forest management will need to be redefined.
The environmental, socio-political, and economic sustainability of
teak and other forest species in state production forests depends on the
kinds and distribution of benefits derived from various species. Until
recently, the state, the SFC, and field foresters have made these decisions
in favor of large-scale production of high-quality forest products to sell on
export and domestic markets. Given the opportunity to participate, forest
farmer groups are likely to make decisions in favor of local needs. In the
long run, therefore, social forestry promises not only to transform the
social institutions involved in managing the forest, but also to transform
the forest itself in favor of long-term production of trees and tree products
for local survival and a different kind of regional development.

